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"AVAILABLE STATE REMEDIES" AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
COMMENTS ON FLORIDA PREPAID V.
COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK
Michael Wells*
Besides explaining the outcome of the case, a Supreme Court
opinion typically contains reasoning that bears on other matters as
well. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank,' decided during the Supreme Court's Octo-
ber 1998 Term, the specific point at issue was the scope of Con-
gress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
impose liability for damages on state governments. In the Patent
Remedy Act, Congress had abrogated the states' sovereign immunity
from claims of patent infringement.2 College Savings Bank argued
for the validity of the statute on the grounds that patents are property;
that patent infringements are deprivations of property; and that the
statute simply and appropriately provides a remedy for deprivations
of property without due process of law.3 The Court agreed that pat-
ents are "a species of property,"4 and that patent infringement could
be a deprivation of property. But it rejected the rest of the argument,
ruling that "for Congress to invoke section 5, it must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions,
and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
2. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a); see Pub. L. No. 102-560, Preamble, 106
Stat. 4230 (1993); see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 (explaining the
congressional response to Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
and similar cases).
3. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
4. Id.
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preventing such conduct."5  In enacting the Patent Remedy Act,
Congress failed to meet this standard.
My aim in this Article is not to mount a full-scale inquiry into
the Court's reasoning in Florida Prepaid, but to examine just one of
the arguments it advanced in support of its ruling.6 While Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's majority opinion does not clearly separate one factor
from another, it contains three distinct strands of reasoning. The
Chief Justice began by noting that Congress had "identified no pat-
tern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of con-
stitutional violations." 7  He then pointed out that "Congress . . .
barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent in-
fringement and hence whether the States' conduct might have
amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 8 Third, the Patent Remedy Act swept too broadly in that it
covered negligent as well as intentional patent infringements; negli-
gent deprivations are not Fourteenth Amendment violations.
9
For present purposes, I wish to put aside the first and third of
these arguments and focus solely on the significance the Court ac-
cords to the "availability of state remedies."' 0 In addition, I leave
aside the question of how one determines whether state remedies are
available and adequate,"1 though in practice, ascertaining adequacy
may be a thorny problem. 12 My topic is the role of adequate state
5. Id. at 2207.
6. Though it contains no discussion of the issues I address here, a useful
general introduction to this case may be found in The Supreme Court, 1998
Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200,223-33 (1999).
7. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
8. Id. at 2209.
9. See id. at 2209-10.
10. Id. at 2209.
11. I treat these two terms as synonyms, as does the Court. See id. at 2208-
09. A state remedy could not be deemed adequate unless it were available, and
it could not fairly be considered available unless it were adequate.
12. For example, federal courts (1) would need to examine not only formal
state law, but also the actual operation of state law, in order to determine
whether a remedy that seems to be available is, in fact, routinely denied in
practice; (2) would need to determine just what level of damages meets con-
stitutional requirements, in the event a state places limits on recovery for patent
infiingement claims that differ from the rules followed in ordinary infrnge-
ment cases against private parties; (3) may need to distinguish among states, in
the event some state legislative and judicial systems behave differently than
others; (4) may need to periodically revisit the issue with regard to any given
state, if the level of protection afforded by the state varies over time; (5) may
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remedies in the law of federal courts. I argue that, in awarding con-
stitutional status to state remedies, Florida Prepaid seems to depart
significantly from established law, for the rule has been that the Con-
stitution is violated when the state official acts, no matter what state
remedies may be available. Yet the opinion is ambiguous, and the
Court does not seem to appreciate the implications of its holding. It
will almost certainly have to find a way to cabin the principle it has
unleashed. An even better solution would be to repudiate Florida
Prepaid's version of the available state remedies argument.
Part I describes the usual role of adequate state remedies in fed-
eral courts law-to serve as the means by which statutory and com-
mon law rules cut off access to federal courts for litigation involving
constitutional questions. State remedies ordinarily have no bearing
on whether the plaintiff states a constitutional claim in the first place.
A central principle of constitutional law, established in Home Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,13 is that the constitu-
tional violation is complete when officials act, even if their conduct
is not authorized by state law. 14 Part I shows that the ambiguous
and confusing opinion in Florida Prepaid may be at odds with the
Home Telephone principle in that the Florida Prepaid Court seems
to treat the availability of state remedies as a ground for finding that
the plaintiff has not even stated a constitutional claim. Assuming
this to be so, Part mI suggests ways in which the Florida Prepaid
principle may be cabined, so as to minimize the extent of the conflict
with Home Telephone. In Part IV I turn to the merits of arguing that
even if the ruling can be confined to a narrow class of cases, the
Court was wrong to treat the availability of state remedies as a
ground for denying the existence of a constitutional claim.
I. STATE REMEDIES AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A central topic in federal courts law is the principle of federal-
ism-the distribution of power between federal and state courts,
need to consider the adequacy of the state remedy on a case-by-case basis, as
any particular litigant would seem to be entitled to make the constitutional ar-
gument that the state remedy received was inadequate.
13. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). See RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1108-11 (4th
ed. 1996).
14. See Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 285-89.
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especially in constitutional cases. The issue arises in a variety of
contexts and has given rise to a complex body of constitutional,
statutory, and common law rules. My concern here is with one nar-
row but crucial aspect of the general problem. I address the question
whether there are constitutional objections to federal jurisdiction, as
distinguished from statutory or common law grounds for requiring
recourse to state court. In order to isolate the issue I seek to explore,
it will be helpful to separate it from other federal courts doctrines
with which it shares some superficially similar features.
Examples of statutory and judge-made rules requiring recourse
to state remedies are common in federal courts law. Sometimes, as
in the Johnson Act,15 the Tax Injunction Act, 16 and the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act,17 Congress explicitly provides that litigants must
pursue adequate state remedies rather than taking their claims to fed-
eral court. Judge-made abstention doctrines provide that litigants
must present their claims to state courts before federal courts will
act.1 8 There is, however, a crucial difference between these statutory
and judge-made rules of deference and the argument that no consti-
tutional violation has taken place until the state courts have ratified
the challenged conduct.
Some early cases, notably Barney v. City of New York, 19 seem to
adopt the latter view, distinguishing between the state and its instru-
mentalities and officers. Though the reasoning of these cases is "less
than clear,, 20 they may be read as holding that the state does not
commit a constitutional violation until the highest court of the state
has ratified the action that someone seeks to challenge on constitu-
tional grounds. Under this view, judicial review of state action
would ordinarily take place in the state courts rather than the federal
courts. One could not bring a suit in federal court to remedy the
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
16. Id. § 1341.
17. 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a) (1994).
18. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 555-61 (1985). See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
718-23 (1996).
19. 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
20. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS 828 (1996); see also
FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 1108-09 (discussing the Barney case and its
aftermath).
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unconstitutional act of a state officer because no constitutional viola-
tion takes place until the state's highest court has upheld the action.
In Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,2'
the Court squarely rejected the proposition that there is no Fourteenth
Amendment violation in the event state remedies are available.
Home Telephone challenged a Los Angeles ordinance that fixed
telephone rates at a level that displeased the company, complaining
that the rates were "so unreasonably low that their enforcement
would bring about the confiscation of the property... and hence the
ordinance was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 22 Relying on Barney and similar cases, the city ar-
gued that, whatever the merits of its rate order, no constitutional
violation would take place until the California courts upheld the or-
dinance.23 But the Supreme Court sided with Home Telephone, de-
claring that "the provisions of the Amendment . . . are generic in
their terms, are addressed, of course, to the states, but also to every
person, whether natural or juridical, who is the repository of state
power." 24 Even if state law forbids the official's act, "the Amend-
ment contemplates the possibility of state officers abusing the pow-
ers lawfully conferred upon them by doing wrongs prohibited by the
Amendment." 25 Driving the point home, the Court explicitly dis-
avowed Barney: "[I]t would be our plain duty to qualify and restrict
the Barney Case in so far as it might be found to conflict with the
rule here applied.",
26
II. How FLORIDA PREPAID THREATENS HOME TELEPHONE
Do not underestimate what is at stake in the choice between
Home Telephone and Barney. By ruling that the constitutional vio-
lation is complete when the official acts, even if state remedies are
available to the person injured, Home Telephone established a key
premise of modem constitutional litigation. Over the course of the
nine decades since that case was handed down, most constitutional
21. 227 U.S. 278, (1913).
22. Id. at 281.
23. See id. at 294.
24. Id. at 286.
25. Id. at 288.
26. Id. at 294.
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oversight of state and local governments, including school desegre-
gation, reapportionment, voting rights, and prison reform litigation,
has taken place in the federal courts. Professor Burt Neubome has
argued that the vigor with which federal courts have enforced Su-
preme Court decrees reflects the "elan" and "sense of mission" in-
stilled by the "elite tradition" of which federal judges are a part.
2 7
Absent Home Telephone, the federal courts would rarely be author-
ized to hear federal constitutional challenges to state action.
The modem Supreme Court has never explicitly expressed any
misgivings about Home Telephone. Yet some of the Court's rea-
soning in Florida Prepaid is hard to square with the earlier case.
The Chief Justice states that "a State's infringement of a patent...
does not by itself violate the Constitution."28 Rather, the availability
of a state remedy negates the College Savings Bank's Fourteenth
Amendment claim that it was deprived of property without due proc-
ess of law: "[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only in-
adequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of
their patent could a deprivation of property without due process re-
sult."29 On its face this passage seems inconsistent with the Home
Telephone rule, which provides that the constitutional violation is
complete when the official acts. But this whole area of the law is rife
with ambiguity and confusion, and the opinion may be read more
narrowly. In this Part, I attempt to identify the issues that need to be
clarified.
At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between two varieties
of due process rights, procedural and substantive. 30 Procedural due
process claims arise in situations in which it is conceded that the
government may properly deprive the plaintiff of life, liberty, or
property, provided that it provides him or her with a fair hearing.
Apart from the criminal process, procedural due process claims arise
mainly in connection with government benefits and government jobs,
some of which are considered "property" for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. An employee who is fired under a cloud has
27. Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1124
(1977).
28. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999).
29. Id.
30. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990).
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been deprived of property. A person confined by the state in a men-
tal hospital or similar facility, even if there is a good reason for the
confinement, also incurs a loss of liberty. Anyone suffering such
injuries at the hands of government is entitled to due process. What
these types of litigation have in common is that the government, on a
proper showing, commits no constitutional violation when it locks up
or executes persons convicted of crimes, dismisses employees, and
incarcerates mentally ill individuals who pose a danger to themselves
or others. Even so, it must, for the sake of preventing errors and
giving people a chance to be heard, accord procedural protections to
the persons who are to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with
the nature and scope of the protections varying according to the
context.
31
The distinctive feature of substantive due process is that some
government actions that deprive individuals of life, liberty, or prop-
erty are forbidden altogether, no matter what procedural safeguards
may be in place. Thus, Home Telephone involved a substantive due
process claim. Home Telephone did not argue that the process by
which the rates were set was defective. It contended that the rates
were simply too low to meet the substantive requirements of the Due
Process Clause, which, at the time of the case in the heyday of eco-
nomic due process, included strict limits on state economic regula-
32 3tion. Roe v. Wade,33 which on Fourteenth Amendment grounds
bars the states from criminalizing most abortions, is another example
of substantive due process. So, too, is the Court's ruling in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis34 that injured persons may recover damages
from government officers whose behavior is deliberate or so egre-
gious that it "shocks the conscience." 35 But a mere common law tort
does not amount to a constitutional violation just because it is a vio-
lation of state law.36 As with procedural due process, the precise
31. For a general introduction to procedural due process, see GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 615-27 (13th
ed. 1997).
32. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 281
(1913).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
35. Id. at 846.
36. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligence); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation).
June 2000] 1671
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W.REVIE W [Vol. 33:1665
contours of this right depend on the circumstances. For example, of-
ficers are held to a higher standard in dealing with persons commit-
ted to their custody than in their interactions with ordinary citizens.
37
A problem with the Florida Prepaid opinion is that one cannot
be sure what target the Court had in mind in raising the "availability
of state remedies" as an answer to the plaintiffs claim.38 For the
sake of setting out the problem the case presents with as much clarity
as possible, I put aside for now the procedural due process reading of
Florida Prepaid and will return to it a bit later. Initially, let us ex-
amine the implications of a substantive due process interpretation of
the decision. Consider the Court's assertion in Florida Prepaid that
"only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate reme-
dies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent
could a deprivation of property without due process result." 39 On the
premise that by "due process" the Court means to refer to substantive
due process, there is no way to reconcile Florida Prepaid with Home
Telephone.40 If, as Home Telephone holds, the substantive due proc-
ess violation is complete when the official acts, without regard to
state remedies, then it does not make any difference whether there
are adequate state remedies. On the other hand, if the availability of
state remedies means that there is no substantive due process viola-
tion, then it is hard to see how Home Telephone could still be good
law.
Florida Prepaid's reference to state remedies may be just a stray
comment in an isolated case. In that event, it could be dismissed as
the product of haste and confusion of a court struggling to finish its
work. And perhaps that is all it is. Florida Prepaid was decided at
the end of the 1998 Term, and this area of constitutional law is af-
flicted by ambiguous and contradictory reasoning. It is a dark wood
in which law clerks, and perhaps even Supreme Court Justices, could
easily lose their way. But the reality may be more complicated than
that, for this is not the first time the modem Court has cast doubt on
37. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851-53.
38. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1999).
39. Id. at 2208.
40. Cf RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 105 (Supp. 1999) (raising the issue, but
not directly answering it).
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Home Telephone. The Florida Prepaid opinion cites authority for
the proposition it advances. The issue of what the Court in Florida
Prepaid really meant to do cannot be put to rest without examining
the cases on which the Court relies.
As support for the proposition that "a deprivation of property
without due process [could] result '41 only where "the State provides
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners,"
42
the Court cited Parratt v. Taylor43 and Hudson v. Palmer.44 In Par-
ratt, Nebraska prison officers had lost some property belonging to an
inmate; the inmate then sued the officers for depriving him of prop-
erty without due process of law.45 The Court held that he had not
stated a good constitutional claim, and the key to its reasoning was
the distinction between the "deprivation" and the "due process"
components of the Due Process Clause.46 It is not enough, the Court
said, to establish that officers have deprived the plaintiff of property.
One must also show that the deprivation took place "without due
process of law." 47 Sometimes a pre-deprivation hearing is required.
When the act is "random and unauthorized,, 48 however, a pre-
deprivation hearing may be impracticable, and a post-deprivation
hearing will suffice for due process.49 The loss of the plaintiffs
property here fell into the latter category. Accordingly, if state
remedies are available for the loss of property suffered at the hands
of state officials, as they were in Nebraska, the plaintiff cannot allege
a constitutional violation simply by charging that he was deprived of
property by state officials.
Hudson added little to the principle established in Parratt. The
Court merely applied Parratt to an intentional deprivation of prop-
erty, reasoning that even an intentional act by a prison guard could
come within the "random and unauthorized" category.
50
41. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
42. Id.
43. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
44. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
45. See Paratt, 451 U.S. at 529.
46. Id. at 536-37.
47. Id. at 537.
48. Id. at 541.
49. See id.
50. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 527, 533 (1981).
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These decisions, by ruling that there is no due process violation
in the event state remedies are available, do indeed support the
holding in Florida Prepaid. Like the Florida Prepaid opinion, the
Court in Parratt and Hudson made no reference to Home Telephone
or Barney or any of the other early cases bearing on whether the
availability of state remedies means that an official has not commit-
ted a violation of substantive due process. Yet Parratt's and Hud-
son's bifurcation between "deprivation" and "without due process of
law" are consistent with Barney and at odds with Home Telephone.
51
In spite of all this, there may be a way to reconcile Florida Pre-
paid with Home Telephone. In order to harmonize the two cases, we
must reject the substantive due process account of Florida Prepaid in
favor of a procedural due process interpretation. Both the Florida
Prepaid opinion and the case law on which it relied furnish grounds
for reading Florida Prepaid in this way. After Parratt and Hudson,
the court in Zinermon v. Burch52 ruled that the Parratt-Hudson doc-
trine does not apply to substantive due process claims, only to proce-
dural ones.53 With regard to substantive claims, the Court in Ziner-
mon explained, "the constitutional violation actionable under section
1983 is complete when the wrongful action is taken."5 4 But the Zin-
ermon plaintiff, a man who had been confined in a mental hospital,
relied on procedural due process.55 As the Court read his complaint,
he conceded that he could lawfully be confined as a substantive
matter, but asserted that he was deprived of liberty without the pro-
cedural safeguards required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 In
such a case, the Court held, "[tihe constitutional violation.., is not
complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and
until the State fails to provide due process."
57
51. See Henry P. Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 990-91 (1986); see also
Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, The Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 576,
581-83 (1993) (discussing the Court's endorsement of two lines of precedent
and the price paid in judicial craft by the Court's failure to acknowledge and
resolve this doctrinal inconsistency).
52. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
53. See id. at 124-26.
54. Id. at 125.
55. See id. at 117.
56. See id. at 122-24.
57. Id. at 126.
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Florida Prepaid quotes Zinermon for this very point.58 Then, in
the very next paragraph, the Court cites Parratt and Hudson for the
proposition that a due process violation is not complete unless "the
State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies." 59 One may
infer from the Court's reference to Zinermon that the later references
to Parratt and Hudson and state remedies have to do with procedural
due process. In this view, Florida Prepaid is merely an application
of the Zinermon rule.
Unfortunately, the procedural due process reading of Florida
Prepaid does not furnish a wholly satisfactory resolution of the
problem presented by the Court's reference to state remedies. The
problem with it is that the nature of the underlying claim in Florida
Prepaid seems to be substantive rather than procedural. The plain-
tiffs argument was not that the state, pursuing its regulatory and
other functions, had authority to infringe its patent so long as it had
in place procedural safeguards against error. Nor did the state claim
any such power. On the contrary, College Savings Bank asserted a
substantive right. It contended that the deliberate infringement of its
patent was a deprivation of property without due process of law,
without regard to any procedural protections that may be available.
Given the substantive nature of College Savings Bank's claim, one
could hardly be faulted for reckoning that, when the Court rejected
the claim, it implicitly ruled that substantive due process is not of-
fended in the event state remedies are available.
It appears that one can reconcile Florida Prepaid with Home
Telephone only by willfully shutting one's eyes to the substantive
nature of the plaintiffs claim in Florida Prepaid. If so, there is Su-
preme Court precedent for that, too. Like the patent infringement
alleged in Florida Prepaid, the underlying claims in Parratt and
Hudson also seem to be substantive rather than procedural. The in-
mates in those cases did not proceed from the premise that it may be
substantively appropriate to lose or destroy their property, so long as
58. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999) ("'[I]n procedural due process claims, the
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest.., is not in
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law."') (emphasis omitted in the Florida Pre-
paid opinion) (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125).
59. Id. at 2208.
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proper procedures were followed. They asserted a substantive right
to the property and demanded compensation for its loss.60 By brute
force, the Court in Zinermon treated those cases as though they
raised procedural due process issues, so as to limit the Parratt doc-
trine in a way that did not threaten Home Telephone. The downside
of that strategy is that Parratt and Hudson remained unburied, the
living dead, lying in wait for Chief Justice Rehnquist to revive them
in Florida Prepaid as grounds for denying constitutional claims
where state remedies are available, and to once again cast a shadow
on Home Telephone.
II. LIMITING THE REACH OF FLORIDA PREPAID
A procedural due process reading of Florida Prepaid's state
remedies prong presents formidable analytical difficulties, yet it
would avoid conflict with Home Telephone. Suppose, however, that
the Court really does mean to treat the constitutional issue raised by a
patent owner as a substantive due process claim, and really does
mean to make an exception to the Home Telephone principle, albeit
without explicitly discussing Home Telephone. If this is the right
way to read Florida Prepaid, then further questions arise: Does the
logic of Florida Prepaid wholly subvert the Home Telephone rule?
Does Florida Prepaid merely carve out a limited exception to the
general rule? What is the nature and scope of that exception? Since
the Court recognizes no conflict between the two cases, it does not
address these issues at all. In this Part, I take it as a given that Home
Telephone will survive more or less intact, no matter what the logic
may be of Florida Prepaid. Consequently, when and if the Court
concludes that the Florida Prepaid opinion, as written, is badly con-
ceived, it will have to return to the issues addressed in the case and
find a way to restrict the inroads the case makes on Home Telephone.
60. See, e.g., CLINTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 885-86; Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 CoLuM. L. Rav. 309, 341-42 (1993); Michael Wells & Thomas
A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18
GA. L. REv. 201, 222-23 (1984). The viability of their substantive claims is a
separate issue. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), decided several
years after Parratt, the Court held that mere negligence is not sufficiently seri-
ous to support a substantive due process claim. After that case, a plaintiff ad-
vancing a claim like the one at issue in Parrat would lose on the merits.
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This Part considers some means by which Florida Prepaid may be
checked, and concludes that the best way to cabin it is to ignore
much of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning and to focus instead on
what is left unsaid in the opinion.
A. Treating Property as a Special Case
The substantive constitutional claim in Florida Prepaid was for
a deprivation of property without due process of law. One might
distinguish between property, on the one hand, and life and liberty on
the other, such that the availability of state remedies would foreclose
the constitutional claim in property, but not liberty cases. Notice,
too, that if Florida Prepaid indeed extends to "liberty" as well as
"property" interests, it seems to cover claims derived from the Bill of
Rights and applied to the states through "incorporation" into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as free speech,'
unreasonable search and seizure, and cruel and unusual punish-
ment.61 Confining the available state remedies principle to property
cases would preserve federal jurisdiction over all of these types of
claims.
The problem with drawing such a distinction is that, however
helpful it may be, there is little doctrinal support for it. Though some
lower courts after Parratt had distinguished liberty from property, in
Zinermon the Court refused to do so for procedural due process
cases. 62 Moreover, there is no apparent basis for such a distinction in
a substantive due process analysis. The point of the available state
remedies prong of Florida Prepaid seems to be that a substantive
due process claim has two distinct and independent components:
(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, i.e., of life,
61. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (citing various
cases).
62. The ground for such a distinction could be that a loss of liberty is, in
general, a more serious matter than a loss of property because "losses of prop-
erty can more readily be made good by a remedy after-the-fact, whereas losses
of liberty interests are somehow more irreparable." CLINTON ET AL., supra
note 20, at 887 (expressing skepticism as to whether this supposed difference
supports access to federal courts rather than "some kind of predeprivation
hearing when liberty... is involved"). The Court in Zinermon, a procedural
due process case, found no "support in precedent for a categorical distinction
between a deprivation of liberty and one of property." Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 132 (1990).
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liberty, or property; and (2) an absence of state remedies. So far as
the Court's reasoning in Florida Prepaid is concerned, the nature of
the constitutionally protected interest has no bearing on whether the
availability of state remedies will thwart the constitutional claim.
63
B. Congress's Section 5 Power
Recall that the point directly at issue in Florida Prepaid is not
the viability of Home Telephone, but the scope of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity from suits for damages. It may be that Florida
Prepaid's rationale that no constitutional claim exists where state
remedies are available only applies in Section 5 cases, leaving Home
Telephone as the rule for other contexts. 64 Support for this view of
the case comes from the long-established distinction between suits
trought against state governments for damages and suits brought
against state officers for prospective relief. Despite state sovereign
immunity, persons seeking to challenge state action may bring suits
for prospective relief under the principle of Ex parte Young,65 in
which the Court ruled that an official who violates the Constitution is
"stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. 66 Fur-
thermore, Ex parte Young suits may be brought in federal court even
when state remedies are available. 67 Nothing in the Florida Prepaid
opinion suggests that this cause of action is no longer viable just be-
cause Congress, in attempting to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
fails to pass legislation that meets the Court's test for valid Section 5
legislation. It appears, then, that there is a constitutional violation for
63. None of this is intended to deny the possibility that a distinction of this
kind may be viable. It remains possible that the Court will, at some point in
the future, assert that there is such a connection and put forth a cogent reason
for it. In this regard, note that the Court has, with some textual justification,
already carved out a special rule for "takings" cases. See discussion infra Part
III.C. One could plausibly argue that every substantive due process "property"
claim ought to be litigated as a "takings" claim.
64. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999).
65. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
66. Id. at 160.
67. This is one of the implications of Home Telephone. See CLINTON ET
AL., supra note 20, at 1250.
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lawsuits against the officer for prospective relief, but not lawsuits
against the state government for damages.
One objection to this approach is that it concedes too much
authority to Florida Prepaid because Congress's Section 5 power
ought to be broad enough to authorize federal damage remedies even
when a state cause of action is available. This goes to the merits of
Florida Prepaid and will be discussed further in Part IV. Another
objection to trying to confine Florida Prepaid in this way is the in-
congruity of treating the same set of circumstances as a constitutional
violation for one purpose but not another. Yet this would not be the
first instance in which Home Telephone is part of such a juggling act.
Compare the rule in Home Telephone-that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation is complete when the official acts, even if state law
does not authorize the action-with the principle of Ex parte
Young-that "the use of the name of the State to enforce an uncon-
stitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without
the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sover-
eign or governmental capacity." 68 The Court has explained Ex parte
Young, and its "'well-recognized irony' that an official's unconstitu-
tional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment but not the Eleventh Amendment," 69 as a "fiction" 70 that "has
been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights.. . .. 71 At the same time, the Court has limited the Ex
parte Young principle to prospective relief, "recogniz[ing] ... that
the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accom-
modated to the constitutional immunity of the States." 72 If the Court
is untroubled by the liberal use of fictions, it could defend such
68. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note
20, at 1101; RICHARD FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 1108. It is noteworthy
that in Home Telephone the loser cited Ex parte Young in support of its posi-
tion. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 280
(1913).
69. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)
(citation omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. Accordingly, the Court has refused to extend the Young doctrine to
efforts to obtain prospective relief on state grounds, for in such circumstances
the federal relief would not "vindicate the supreme authority of federal law."
Id. at 106.
72. Id. at 105.
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a distinction between the Section 5 issue and prospective relief in the
same way.
C. Takings Law
There is a way to keep Florida Prepaid from overrunning the
whole law of constitutional remedies without drawing arbitrary dis-
tinctions between liberty and property or prospective and retrospec-
tive relief, and without making special rules that unduly restrict Con-
gress's Section 5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court could have avoided the broad issue of congressional
power to enforce the Due Process Clause by adjudicating the case
under the Takings Clause, which obliges governments to pay just
compensation when they take private property for public use. Recall
that College Savings Bank claimed that Florida had taken its prop-
erty when the state deliberately infringed its patent, just as if the state
had appropriated real property belonging to the bank. In advancing
this theory, College Savings Bank stood on solid ground. The Court
has long recognized that patents are "a species of property" 73 and
that government interference with patents and other intellectual
property may constitute a taking of that property for which just com-
pensation must be paid.74
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist restricted his Section 5 analysis
to the issue of whether the statute was an appropriate means of reme-
dying violations of the Due Process Clause, the outcome of Florida
Prepaid may be easier to justify by conceiving of the case as a tak-
ings problem, rather than by putting it in the due process domain. In
the takings context, the Supreme Court has already carved out a nar-
row exception to Home Telephone. The Takings Clause does not
forbid all takings of property, but only those effected "without just
compensation."75 Relying on this language, the Court held in Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
76
73. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999).
74. See Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropria-
tion of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and
After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doc-
trines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 849, 864-73 (1998).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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that "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just com-
pensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied
just compensation., 77 Beginning from this premise, the Florida Pre-
paid Court could have held that when state remedies are available to
provide just compensation, Congress lacks grounds for authorizing
access to federal court.
A crucial premise of this theory of the case is that the infringe-
ment claim should be decided under takings principles, rather than
general due process law. The authority for this premise comes from
Graham v. Connor,78 in which the issue was whether the police were
liable for using excessive force in arresting a suspect. Relying on
earlier cases that established that personal security against physical
injury is an aspect of Fourteenth Amendment "liberty," Graham ad-
vanced a substantive due process theory, charging that the officers'
use of force deprived him of liberty without due process of law. The
Court ruled that "such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under
a substantive due process standard. 79 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained the preference for a Fourth Amendment
analysis: "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit tex-
tual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically
intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more gen-
eralized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for
analyzing these claims."
80
Cases after Graham have reiterated this presumption against
substantive due process.8' In the context of government appropria-
tions of private property for its own use, the Takings Clause is the
explicit textual source of constitutional protection. One implication
of putting substantive due process in the category of disfavored con-
stitutional arguments and presumptively preferring "specific
77. Id. at 195.
78. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
79. Id. at 388.
80. Id. at 395.
81. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion);
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1992); see also
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-44 (1998) (endorsing the
maxim, but finding it inapplicable to this case).
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constitutional standard[s],"82 is that takings law ought to be the ap-
propriate category for patent infringement. Treating it as such sup-
plies a ready-made basis for recognizing a narrow, context-specific
exception to Home Telephone. Assuming the Court is wedded to the
outcome of Florida Prepaid, it could do worse than to reconstruct
the ruling along these lines. In this way, simply by insisting that pat-
ent infringement claims be litigated under the Takings Clause, the
Court could have put patent infringement within the pre-existing ex-
ception to Home Telephone for takings, thereby avoiding the prob-
lem of reconciling Home Telephone with Florida Prepaid's seem-
ingly unbounded "availability of state remedies" exception to
substantive due process.
83
IV. STATE REMEDIES, FEDERAL COURTS LAW,
AND THE CONSTITUTION
The discussion in Part Ill of ways in which Florida Prepaid can
be reconciled with Home Telephone leaves open the question of
whether Florida Prepaid is correctly decided on the merits. In my
view, the Court is simply wrong, however narrow the holding may
be. In this Part, I contend that contrary to Florida Prepaid, the avail-
ability of state remedies should have no weight at all as an argument
against the existence of a constitutional right.84 Instead, the
82. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
83. The Court explained its refusal to treat the Patent Remedy Act as an ef-
fort to enforce the Takings Clause by observing that Congress did not rely on
that clause in enacting the legislation:
Since Congress was so explicit about invoking its authority under Ar-
ticle I and its authority to prevent a State from depriving a person of
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we think this omission precludes consideration of the Just Com-
pensation Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act.
Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7. However, the grounds for the statute
are irrelevant to the theory of the case that is advanced in the text. The under-
lying patent infringement claim should be treated as a takings issue, and re-
jected on the authority of Williamson County, unless the plaintiff can show that
state remedies are not available. Whatever grounds the statute rests on, it can-
not be used to enforce an underlying infringement claim that lacks constitu-
tional status. In any event, there is ample support for the view that the Court
should consider all possible grounds on which a statute may be upheld, and not
just those that Congress identifies. See Heald & Wells, supra note 74, at 893.
84. The point here is not that state remedies ought to be constitutionally ir-
relevant. The absence or inadequacy of state remedies is actually a compelling
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availability of state remedies is a factor that is appropriately consid-
ered by Congress in enacting jurisdictional statutes and by the Su-
preme Court in making judge-made rules limiting access to federal
court.
The problem with according constitutional status to the avail-
ability of state remedies is not that state remedies are irrelevant to
whether litigants should have access to federal court. On the con-
trary, the fact that state remedies are adequate is a valid argument
against federal jurisdiction.85 The flaw in Florida Prepaid is that the
Court elevates "available state remedies" from a policy consideration
to a constitutional barrier. There are powerful countervailing argu-
ments in favor of access to federal court, based mainly on the dispar-
ity between federal and state judges. In brief, federal judges are,
generally speaking, likely to be more talented than state judges, to
have greater expertise than state judges in adjudicating federal issues,
and to be more sympathetic to federal claims than state judges.
86
While I do not believe that this disparity gives anyone a constitu-
tional right to litigate in federal court, it is a sound basis for statutory
and judge-made rules that permit federal adjudication of constitu-
tional claims, even if state remedies are available.
In addition, the strength of the adequate state remedies argument
varies significantly among the variety of procedural and remedial
contexts in which substantive federal law issues may arise. These
contextual features can be, and are, taken into account by Congress
or by judicial rule-making. Examples include: (1) the existence of a
pending state proceeding in which the federal issue may be raised,
and the value of avoiding disruption of that proceeding and duplica-
tion of effort, which underlies Younger abstention; 87 (2) the presence,
in a case where Pullman abstention is appropriate, of both state and
federal issues, in a case in which state law is uncertain and its
argument in favor of a constitutional right of access to federal court. See, e.g.,
Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon ofAccept-
able Arguments, 47 EMoRY L.J. 89, 101 (1998). The argument is that the con-
verse of this proposition is not true. While inadequacy may be constitutionally
decisive, the adequacy of state remedies should not cut off a constitutional
claim.
85. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 611-22 (1981).
86. See Wells, supra note 84, at 108-09.
87. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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resolution may enable the court to avoid a sensitive constitutional is-
sue; 88 (3) the application of general principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, in cases where state courts have already ruled,
under the principle of Allen v. McCurry;89 (4) the need, reflected in
the exhaustion rule in habeas corpus, to shield the integrity of state
criminal processes from federal court interference; 90 and (5) the
minimization of the burden on the federal courts of matters that can
be handled effectively at the local level. 91 It is entirely appropriate
for Congress and the Court to take such considerations into account
as grounds for context-specific limits on access to federal court. But
the viability of such arguments for deference to state remedies lends
no support at all to the constitutional rule of Florida Prepaid, which
pays no attention to the remedial and procedural posture in which the
substantive issues are presented and which Congress cannot modify.
This charge would remain valid even if Florida Prepaid were
cabined in the ways suggested in Part HI, though Florida Prepaid
would do less damage to the traditional role of federal courts in en-
forcing federal law, and therefore would be less objectionable, if it
were construed narrowly rather than broadly.
In order to justify a constitutional rule of deference, one must
put aside these narrow policies and articulate a far more general
principle of deference to state remedies. The implicit premise of
Florida Prepaid's availability of state remedies prong seems to be
that in our federal system, the balance of judicial power should favor
state over federal courts in cases where litigants seek to strike down
state law on federal grounds. To borrow Justice Frankfurter's for-
mulation of the argument, "due regard for the natural sensitiveness of
the states and for the appropriate responsibility of state courts to cor-
rect the action of lower state courts and state officials"92 requires, as
88. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
89. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
90. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (detailing the need
to minimize friction between state and federal governments by allowing the
state to hear violations of "prisoners' federal rights")
91. See Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
the purposes served by the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act).
92. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 16 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 1109-10 (discussing Justice Frank-
furter's attempt to resuscitate the Barney doctrine).
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a matter of constitutional law, that the state courts have the primary
responsibility for adjudicating federal challenges to state action, so
long as they provide adequate remedies.
The point of the italicized phrase in the preceding sentence is to
stress that the premise of Florida Prepaid is not merely that consti-
tutional litigation ought to take place in the state courts. It is that this
proposition has constitutional stature and, therefore, cannot be modi-
fied by Congress. Compare this premise with the traditional under-
standing of congressional power over federal jurisdiction. Under its
broad Article I power over the jurisdiction of lower federal courts,
Congress may cut off access to those courts and channel constitu-
tional litigation to the state courts, whether for the reasons suggested
by Justice Frankfurter or to lessen the burden of the federal judiciary
or merely because it prefers the way state courts resolve these issues.
The point is that these decisions about allocating decision-making
between federal and state courts are for Congress to make.93 Though
scholars quarrel about the details, there is a broad judicial and schol-
arly consensus on the general principle of congressional control.
By striking down an effort by Congress to broaden access to
federal courts for constitutional claimants, Florida Prepaid poses a
radical challenge to the Court's solidly established doctrine on con-
gressional control over jurisdiction. In my view, the established
doctrine is correct and Florida Prepaid is wrong. As a matter of
constitutional structure, Congress is well-suited to make decisions
about the distribution of judicial power between the federal and state
courts. Members of Congress are elected from the states, and there-
fore must be sensitive to local concerns. At the same time, no one
parochial interest can easily prevail in Congress because any par-
ticular interest must compete with other values. It may be that pro-
tecting state governments from efforts by Congress to override their
autonomy is a good reason for the Court to step in to protect the
states in some circumstances. But when the issue is as it was in
Florida Prepaid-the enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment
93. See Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 476 (1991). At the subconstitu-
tional level of federal common law rules, the Supreme Court also appropriately
makes law on these matters. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discre-
tion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 555-61 (1985).
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rights-the case for judicial intervention to shield the states is espe-
cially weak. The traditional role of the judiciary is to vindicate indi-
vidual rights against the states, not to save the states from congres-
sional efforts to better enforce individual rights.
94
94. The arguments advanced in this paragraph are further developed in Mi-
chael Wells, Suing States for Money: Constitutional Remedies After Alden and
Florida Prepaid, RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2000).
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